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Relevance of the theme. Since its inception during World War II, nuclear 
weapons have been and remain a strong argument in international relations and have 
become a guarantee of the security of the countries that possess them. The world's 
leading countries have spent enormous sums on developing their own nuclear arsenal, 
and later on its development and maintenance. 
The quantitative development of nuclear weapons reached its peak during the 
last years of the Cold War in 1980-1987, and only after 1987 the trend of reducing 
the number of nuclear weapons in the world have begun. Ukraine was one of the 
important participants of this process. 
Having inherited the third largest nuclear arsenal from the USSR, Ukraine has 
renounced its nuclear weapons, becoming one of the few countries to make this step. 
However, military aggression in the east of the country makes it important to study 
the prospects for the return of Ukraine's nuclear status in order to guarantee territorial 
integrity and national security. 
The study of problem. The causes of nuclear disarmament, its consequences 
and the chronology of the process were studied in the works of a number of scientists, 
namely: A.M. Zlenko, V.P. Gorbulin, А.G. Arbatov, V.F. Vasylenko,                    
V.G. Lukyanenko, KV Shevchuk, D.O. Rafeenko, G.O. Kovalyako, P. Mozias, D. 
Goodby, S. Miller and others. However, the scientific literature pays little attention to 
the consequences of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and the prospects for restoring its 
nuclear status. 
The purpose of the qualification paper is to investigate the causes and 
consequences of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament and to assess the prospects for the 
return of nuclear status. 
In accordance with the purpose of the qualification work, the following tasks 
were set: 
- to study the history of development and use of nuclear weapons; 
- to analyze the dynamics of nuclear proliferation; 
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- to consider international treaties relating to nuclear disarmament; 
- to investigate the causes and consequences of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament; 
- to assess the prospects and threats to Ukraine's return to nuclear status. 
The object of study is nuclear weapons. 
 The subject of research is the reasons and consequences of Ukraine’s nuclear 
disarmament and prospects for returning nuclear status. 
Research methods. To achieve the goals set in the work, the following 
methods were used: abstract-logical, method of grouping and generalization, system 
and complex approach, factor analysis, causal analysis, and method of comparative 
analysis. 
Information base. During writing qualification work, legislative and 
normative acts in the field of nuclear weapons disarmanent, official statistics, 















1 NUCLEAR FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD 
POLITICS 
1.1 The essence of nuclear weapons 
 
 
Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass explosive destruction based on the use 
of nuclear energy released during a nuclear fission chain reaction of heavy nuclei and 
/ or a thermonuclear fusion reaction [1].  
The concept of nuclear weapons includes:  
- nuclear charges (missile and torpedo warheads, bombs, artillery shells, etc.); 
- means of delivery to the target (missiles, planes, torpedoes, artillery guns);  
- means of controls. 
Nuclear weapons differ significantly from other weapons in both scale and 
nature of destruction. At a distance of about a kilometer from the center of the 
explosion, there is continuous destruction and all living things are destroyed. First of 
all, this action is due to the fact that the power of a nuclear explosion is much greater 
than any warhead created on the basis of a chemical explosive. That is why, among 
modern means of warfare, nuclear weapons have the greatest destructive power [2].
 Nuclear weapons are based on the usage of internal nuclear reactions: the 
separation of heavy elements uranium - 233, uranium - 235, plutonium - 239 and the 
synthesis of helium atoms from light elements - deuterium and tritium. Per unit mass 
of the resulting mass, the synthesis reaction gives an energy output 4 times higher 
than the fission reaction. With an equal amount of reactants in the process of nuclear 
reactions, millions of times more energy is released than in the process of chemical 
reactions that occur during the explosion of a conventional warhead.   
The energy of a nuclear explosion is spent on the formation of many damaging 
factors, the main of which are the explosive wave (it accounts for 50% of the total 
energy of the explosion), light radiation (35%), penetrating radiation at the time of 
explosion (5%), formation of nuclear fission products (10%). Unlike other weapons, 
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nuclear weapons are capable of simultaneously solving not only operational and 
tactical tasks, but also strategic tasks of war [3]. 
In the event of a surprising attack using nuclear weapons, the total human loss 
can reach up to 50-60% of the total population in the area of nuclear damage. At the 
same time, 1/3 of human losses will be irreversible, 2/3 will be sanitary losses. In the 
structure of sanitary losses in the epicenter of a nuclear explosion, 50-60% will be 
combined lesions [4].  
Thus, nuclear weapon is the most dangerous type of weapon, which is 
distinguished by its destructive power, the nature of the damage and the range of use, 
which makes it possible to shape military strategies in a special way. 
 
 
1.2 Creation and using nuclear weapons: a historical aspect 
 
 
The history of nuclear weapons dates back to 1898, when Pierre and Marie 
Curie discovered a substance in the uranium mineral that emitted large amounts of 
radiation. This discovery has led scientists to speculate that there is a huge potential 
for new energy, which is hidden in the atoms of radioactive elements. Later, in 1911, 
Ernest Rutherford made a breakthrough in the study of atoms, and in 1932, Ernest 
Walton and John Cockfort first split the nucleus of the atom [5]. 
In December 1938, German physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann for the 
first time in the world carried out artificial fission of the nucleus of the uranium atom, 
which opened the possibility of creating a new type of high-explosive substance. This 
event was the impetus for the development of the German nuclear program - work 
aimed at creating nuclear weapons, which took place in Nazi Germany in 1939-1945. 
The German nuclear program did not succeed, unlike the American one. In 
1943, the USA of America (USA) nuclear weapons program began, codenamed the 
Manhattan Project. The program involved a group of prominent physicists, most of 
whom were refugees from Europe. On July 16, 1945 Americans tested the first 
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nuclear bomb in the history of mankind, called "Trinity", with a force of 21 kilotons 
(kt). This event took place in New Mexico [6]. 
On August 6, 1945, the USA first used an atomic bomb for military purposes. 
The USA dropped a uranium nuclear bomb called the "Little Boy" (11 kt) on the 
Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, on August 6, 1945, an American 
bomber dropped a plutonium atomic bomb, "Fat Man" (21 kt), on the Japanese city of 
Nagasaki. The USA occupation army headquarters in Japan estimates that the 
Hiroshima bombing killed 140,000 people and the Nagasaki bombing                        
killed 74,000 [7]. 
The exceptional destructive power of nuclear weapons, demonstrated by the 
bombing, marked the beginning of the nuclear arms race between the USA and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which was an important part of the Cold 
War, global geopolitical, ideological, military and economic conformation. 
 
 
1.3 Proliferation of nuclear weapons 
 
 
The development of the USSR’s atomic bomb began in 1942, and German 
scientists were also involved in the process. The development was succed when on 
August 29, 1949, "RDS-1" bomb (22kt) was successfully tested. Britain also joined 
the confrontation on October 3, 1952, after successful testing a bomb called 
"Hurricane" (25 kt) [8]. 
After the successful development of atomic bombs, countries began to develop 
means of delivery. Enormous sums were invested in improving the quality of 
weapons and increasing their quantity. At the beginning of the nuclear race, the USA, 
of course, had a great advantage over the USSR because they conducted nuclear tests 
of their own bombs four years earlier and even managed to use them for their 
intended purpose. Thus, as of mid-1952, the number of nuclear warheads in the 
service of the USA Army exceeded 1,000, while the USSR had only 50, and other 
countries were only engaged in development [9]. 
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Such a division of forces did not suit the USSR, so the government allocated 
more and more money for the development of production, infrastructure and 
development of existing technologies. Both nations quickly began developing 
thermonuclear weapons. Soviet intelligence even tried to obtain information on the 
development of the American thermonuclear bomb, but this attempt was 
unsuccessful. The USA blew up such a device on November 1, 1952. The device was 
named "Ivy Mike" and had an incredible power, which was estimated at 10,400 kt 
[10]. On August 12, 1953, the USSR also tested its own thermonuclear weapons. The 
power of the explosion was estimated at 400 kt, which was much lower than the 
bomb produced by the USA, but the important fact was that the USSR bomb "RDS-
6s" was the first bomb produced in the size of the bomb division of the aircraft, rather 
than a stationary structure the size of a two-story building. On November 8, 1957, 
Britain also tested a thermonuclear bomb [11]. 
A little later, France and China developed their own nuclear weapons. India, 
Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Israel and South Africa later 
joined, but there are no reliable facts about the nuclear tests of the last two countries, 
there is only an assumption about a 2-3 kilotones nuclear explosion near Prince 
Edward Islands by Israel and South Africa [12].  
The USSR government sought to neutralize the USA advantage by creating 
more and more warheads, but the Americans did not stand on the one place. For 
1967, the USA had more than 31,000 nuclear warheads, while the USSR had about 
8,300 charge warheads. Britain, France, and China also developed their own nuclear 
weapons, but their arsenals were meager compared to the two "superpowers," Britain 
had about 270 shells, France 36, and China 25 [13]. 
On May 26, 1972, the USA and the USSR signed the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty, which marked the beginning of a process called the "discharging 
of international tensions." For the first time, the USSR and the USA have declared 
their intention to stop the nuclear arms race. The treaty limited the number of nuclear 
warheads, ballistic missiles and launchers on both sides to the level they were at at 
the time (at that time the United States had about 27,000 nuclear warheads and the 
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USSR about 15,000). It provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles placed on 
submarines, strictly in the amount in which the obsolete ground-based ballistic 
missiles were previously written off [14].   
The USA has indeed stopped increasing its nuclear weapons advantage, even 
by slightly reducing its nuclear arsenal, while the USSR has taken advantage of the 
situation and not only reduced the gap, but even surpassed the USA in nuclear power. 
Other countries had moderate stockpiles of nuclear weapons. 
The nuclear arms race peaked in 1987, when the number of nuclear weapons 
reached about 63,500, of which about 38,000 were owned by the USSR and about 
23,500 by the USA [15]. Awareness of the importance of the threat of nuclear 
weapons to humanity and civilization has led to the development of a number of 
international measures to minimize the risk of its proliferation and use. In 1979, the 
Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was signed. And in 1987, the USSR and the 
USA signed an agreement to eliminate medium-range and short-range missiles, 
which led to a significant reduction in the number of nuclear weapons.  
Thus, in five years, the number of nuclear weapons was reduced by more than 
a quarter, from about 63,500 nuclear warheads in 1987 to less than 40,000 (the USA 
had about 12,000, the USSR had about 25,000) in 1992, this was only the beginning 
of a declining nuclear weapons, which are preserved to this day [16]. 
The last country joined the club of nuclear-weapon states was the North Korea, 
conducting its first nuclear test in 2006. More details on the chronology of nuclear 
explosions can be found in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 - Major nuclear explosions [17] 
Date Country Name Power, kt Value 
16 July 1945 USA Triniti 21 
The first atomic bomb 
explosion in history 
6 August 
1945 
USA Little Boy 11 




USA Fat Man 21 The bombing of Nagasaki 
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Continuation of Table 1.3 
Date Country Name Power, kt Value 
29 August 
1949 











USA Ive Mike 10400 




USSR RDS-6s 400 
USSR’s first 
thermonuclear explosion 
1 March 1954 USA Castle Bravo 15000 






Scrumble Х 1800 






Blue jerboa 60 




USSR King Bomb 58600 




China 596 22 






















India Shakti-1 30 




Pakistan Chagai-1 ~9 







DPRK's first nuclear 
explosion 
 
Thus, nuclear weapon is the most dangerous type of weapon, which is 
distinguished by its destructive power, the nature of the damage and the range of use, 
which makes it possible to shape military strategies in a special way. The driving 
force behind the development of nuclear weapons was the USA which was the first to 
test and use nuclear weapons in action, and the USSR, which carried out the most 
powerful nuclear explosion in history. 
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2 GLOBAL NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
2.1 Objectives and means of nuclear weapons control 
 
 
 Nuclear weapons are still the embodiment of power and strength in 
international relations. Despite numerous innovations in the military sphere and the 
development of a number of new weapons, the role of nuclear weapons has not 
changed. This phenomenon has several dimensions. 
 Firstly, nuclear weapons are of strategic and political importance. For example, 
Britain or France would not have such influence, if not in the international arena as a 
whole, then at least in the United Nations (UN), if they did not possess nuclear  
weapons [18]. 
 Secondly, countries with nuclear weapons are more prone to the use of military 
force and violations of international law. In some cases, the availability of nuclear 
weapons in the country was a determining factor in deciding to launch a military 
operation and send troops to different regions far from their own borders. For 
example, after World War II, the USA carried out about 70 military interventions. 
Also during this time, at least 10 times there have been open threats of the use of 
nuclear weapons, which can be considered as a passive use of nuclear capabilities 
during military or diplomatic conflicts. The USSR has also been involved in dozens 
of conflicts around the world, mostly without waiting for a UN Security Council 
resolution [19]. 
 However, there are other examples. India and Pakistan are extremely reluctant 
to use force in the international arena in the absence of direct threats to their national 
security. China has also been embroiled in no conflict since the 1979 Sino-Vietnam 
War [20]. 
 The above suggests that there is no direct link between nuclear capabilities and 
the country's aggression. Rather, it depends on historical and political circumstances. 
 Third feature of nuclear weapons is that their strategic and political 
significance directly affects its proliferation, as this is the motivation for those who 
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seek to possess them. This means that the threat of a non-proliferation regime will 
exist as long as nuclear weapons exist [21]. 
 However, from the nine nuclear nations, only four command a strategic force 
ready for immediate deployment, while the other five keep their nuclear capabilities 
in reserve. This confirms the idea that in today's world, weapons of mass impression 
play primarily a political rather than a military role. As a source of international 
status and power, nuclear weapons guarantee sovereignty and security in an 
aggressive international environment. 
 At the height of the Cold War, it was believed that the exchange of nuclear 
strikes between the USSR and the USA would lead to the end of life on the                
planet [22]. 
  The Caribbean crisis of 1962 is accepted to consider the beginning of 
disarmament, when the world first found itself on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. 
The reason was the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Turkey, 
which provoked the USSR to urgently install similar missiles in Cuba. One of the 
consequences of the Caribbean crisis was the emergence of a powerful social 
movement in the West in support of nuclear disarmament. In the process of 
disarmament there was an economic implication: the expansion of the nuclear arsenal 
carried a colossal burden on the country's economy [23]. 
 Nuclear disarmament is considered to be the process of reducing the arsenals of 
nuclear weapons, their carriers, means of delivery and production, the main purpose 
of disarmament is to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, which, of course, is a 
threat to humanity. 
 The main legal means of controlling proliferation is the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a multilateral international instrument 
developed by the UN Disarmament Committee to create a barrier to expanding the 
number of nuclear-weapon states and ensuring international control. To fulfill the 
obligations of the countries those have acceded to this agreement in order to prevent 
the possibility of a military conflict with the use of nuclear weapons [24]. 
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 It is the United Nations that deals with issues related to the threat and control 
of nuclear weapons. The UN system includes an international organization for the 
development of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which was 
founded in 1957 and is called the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [25]. 
 With the advent of NPT, agency’s work has become particularly important, as 
the NPT has made it mandatory for each member state to conclude a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA [26]. 
 The purpose of the Agency's work in the country is to state that work in the 
peaceful nuclear field is not switched to military purposes. The state, signing such an 
agreement, guarantees that it does not conduct military research, so this document is 
called a guarantee agreement [27]. 
 At the same time, the IAEA is a purely technical body. It cannot give a 
political assessment of the activities of a state. The IAEA has no right to speculate - 
the agency works only with ready-made facts, basing its conclusions solely on the 
actual result of inspections. The IAEA safeguards system cannot physically prevent 
the reorientation of nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes, but only 
allows for the reorientation of safeguarded material or misuse of a guaranteed 
installation and the initiation of consideration of such facts at the UN. At the same 
time, the Agency's conclusions are extremely careful and correct. 
 The functions of the Agency include: 
 - encouraging research and development on the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy; 
 - encouraging the exchange of scientific achievements and methods; 
 - formation and application of a system of guarantees that civilian nuclear 
programs and developments will not be used for military purposes; 
 - development, establishment and adaptation of norms in the field of health and 
safety [28]. 
 However, in addition to the NPT, there are a number of bilateral and 
multilateral international agreements that are holding back the increase in the number 
of nuclear weapons in the world. 
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2.2 Nuclear weapons control and disarmament agreements 
 
 
Given the devastating consequences that nuclear war would have for all 
mankind, there is a need for humanity to make every effort to prevent the danger of 
such a war and to take measures to ensure the security of the peoples. This intention 
has led to the conclusion of a number of treaties controlling the number of nuclear 
weapons and their proliferation [29]. 
As already mentioned, the main means of controlling proliferation is NPT, 
developed by the United Nations Disarmament Committee. 
The treaty was approved by the UN General Assembly on June 12, 1968 and 
entered into force on March 5, 1970. On May 11, 1995, more than 170 member states 
agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely without any additional conditions. The parties 
to the treaty are almost all independent states of the world, except for Israel, India, 
Pakistan, North Korea and South Sudan [30]. 
 An agreement sets that the state, that owns a nuclear weapon, is considered as 
the state that created and blew up such weapon or device to January, 1, 1967 (the 
USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and China).   
By Agreement, each of states-participants that own a nuclear weapon is 
obligated not to pass weapon or other nuclear explosive devices, and also control 
above them neither straight, nor side; equal as and in no way to help, not to 
encourage and induce no state that does not own a nuclear weapon, to making or 
acquisition in any other way of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices, 
and also to control with them [31]. 
A basic problem from the point of view of control after the observance of NPT 
is that the same process - enriching of uranium is can be used both for the receipt of 
nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations and in creation of nuclear bomb. Making of 
nuclear materials for a bomb can come true secretly, under the guise of production of 
nuclear fuel (in what suspect Iran) - or, as in a situation with North Korea, a state-
participant of NPT can simply go out from Agreement. In other words, presence or 
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absence of political will - it all, that can prevent to any state, develops nuclear energy, 
to create an own nuclear bomb. However creation of nuclear bomb is considerably 
more difficult process, than enriching of uranium is in peaceful aims [32]. 
However, except NTA there is yet a row of bilateral and multilateral 
international agreements that restrain the increase of amount of nuclear weapon in the 
world (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 - The main nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties [33] 
Year Treaty  
1959 
Antarctic Treaty - prohibits weapons testing and deployment in Antarctica 
(multilateral) 
1963 
Partial Test Ban Treaty - bans atmospheric, underwater and outer-space 
nuclear tests (multilateral) 
1967 Outer Space Treaty - bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in space 
1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 
1) prohibits the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states; 
2)  commits the five recognized nuclear powers to the reduction 
and removal of their weapons over time (multilateral) 
1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 1 - limits strategic nuclear weapons and 
freezes intercontinental ballistic missiles at 1972 levels (USA/USSR) 
1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - limits the number of anti-ballistic missiles 
(USA/USSR) 
1987 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty - eliminates all intermediate range 
nuclear weapons in Europe (USA/USSR) 
1991 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1 - limits the number of nuclear warheads 
and delivery systems (USA/USSR) 
1991 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 2 - further limits the number of nuclear 
warheads and eliminates certain categories of the warhead (USA/Russia) 
1996 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - bans the testing of weapons, but not 
ratified by the USA, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea (multilateral) 
2002 
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty - limits the number of 
deployed nuclear warheads (USA/Russia) 
2010 
New START Treaty - limits both sides’ nuclear warheads to 1550, a 30% 
reduction on Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty and a 74% reduction on 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1 (USA/Russia) 
2017 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ‒ comprehensively prohibit 




The first treaty regulating the development of nuclear weapons was the 
Multilateral Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Testing in the 
Atmosphere, Space and Underwater, signed in 1963 between Russia, the USA and 
Great Britain. In 1968, the above-mentioned Multilateral Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed. Subsequently, it was signed by almost 
all countries (except Israel, Pakistan and India) [34]. 
However, a number of treaties between the two superpowers, the USSR and the 
USA, which had nuclear arsenals dozens of times the arsenals of all other countries, 
had a greater impact on nuclear disarmament.  
On May 26, 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was signed, which 
marked the beginning of a process that later became known as the "detente of 
international tensions." For the first time, the USA and the USSR have declared their 
intention to stop the nuclear race. The treaty limited the number of nuclear warheads, 
ballistic missiles and launchers on both sides to the level they were at the time [35]. 
On the same day, the Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems was 
signed. The parties refused to create, test and deploy missile defense systems or 
components (AMD). From July 1974, under an additional protocol to the contract 
was allowed to have only one such system. The USSR has deployed its anti-missile 
system around Moscow, and the USA around 12 launchers at the Grand Forks base in 
North Dakota. Fulfillment of these obligations made the mutual destruction of the 
USSR and the USA inevitable in the event of a nuclear war between them. The threat 
of mutual destruction became the basis of the concept of nuclear deterrence [36]. 
On June 18, 1979, the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was signed. 
For the first time, the USSR and the USA agreed not only to limit but also to reduce 
the number of nuclear weapons. The agreement limited the number of strategic 
carriers (intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles, submarines, and heavy 
bombers) to 2,400 units, by January 1, 1981 the countries undertook to reduce their 
number to 2,150. Of the total number of strategic systems, only 1,320 carriers could 
be equipped with main parts with combat units of individual guidance. Due to the 
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introduction of the USSR’s troops into Afghanistan, the treaty was not ratified by the 
US Senate, although its provisions were respected by both parties [37]. 
 On December 8, 1987, the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium-Range and 
Short-Range Missiles was signed. The deployment of American ballistic nuclear 
missiles in Western Europe reduced the time of their approach to the target in the 
USSR from 25-30 minutes to 7-10 minutes. At the same time, USSR’s missiles could 
hit targets in Europe. This drastically reduced the reaction time and posed the threat 
of a "decapitated" first strike on enemy command posts, which called into question 
the guarantee of mutual destruction and increased the risk of nuclear war. The 
agreement provided for the destruction by the parties within three years of all existing 
surface-to-air missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km, as well as mutual inspections. 
The USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems (about half of them were missiles that 
were not on combat duty); USA - 846 complexes, including missiles deployed in 
Western Europe [38]. 
On July 30-31, 1991, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty was signed. 
For the first time, the USSR and the USA agreed on a significant reduction in nuclear 
weapons and mutual control over the implementation of obligations. Each of the 
parties undertook to have no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads seven years after the 
entry into force of the treaty. In reality, according to the "rules of offset" of warheads 
on heavy bombers, the USSR could have about 6,500 warheads, and the USA - 8,500. 
Basement of mobile ground missile systems was allowed only in limited areas [39]. 
On December 6, 2001, Russia and the United States announced their 
obligations under the START-1 Treaty. At that time, Russia had 1,136 strategic 
carriers and 5,518 nuclear warheads, and the USA had 1,237 carriers out of 5,948 
warheads. The implementation of the agreements was complicated by the collapse of 
the USSR, as nuclear weapons were located in other former republics of the Union. 
On May 23, 1992, Russia, the USA, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus signed an 
additional protocol under which three former USSR republics joined the treaty. All 




On January 3, 1993, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty was signed 
between Russia and the USA. The treaty provided for the most significant reduction 
in the history of the nuclear arsenals of the largest nuclear powers - almost 2 times. 
Russia and the USA have committed themselves to reducing the number of their 
strategic warheads to 3,000 to 3,500. More than 1,750 warheads could not be placed 
on naval-based ballistic missiles. The parties undertook to eliminate all ground-based 
ballistic missiles equipped with more than one warhead and all heavy missiles. 
Missile launchers with the main parts of individual guidance had to be either 
eliminated or converted into monoblock missile launchers. On May 24, 2002, the 
Agreement on Reducing Strategic Offensive Capabilities was signed. The treaty 
limited the number of nuclear warheads on combat duty to 1700-2200 for each         
party [41]. 
On April 8, 2010, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty was signed, 
replacing two previous agreements. Russia and the USA have pledged to reduce and 
limit the number of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive weapons. In 
particular, reduce the number of deployed strategic carriers on each side to 700 units, 
and ammunition on them - up to 1550 units. The parties agreed on a mechanism for 
mutual verification of compliance. Russia and the USA announced the achievement 
of the treaty level of 1,550 deployed warheads in early 2018 [42]. 
On July 7, 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was 
adopted - an international agreement that prohibits the development, testing, storage, 
acquisition, transportation and use of nuclear weapons. The treaty will enter into 
force after it is ratified by 50 states [43]. 
The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, according to its supporters, should become 
an “unequivocal political commitment” to create and maintain a world free of nuclear 
weapons. However, unlike a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the 
treaty does not contain all the legal and technical measures necessary to eliminate the 
threat. Such provisions will be the subject of subsequent negotiations to allow for an 
initial agreement without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon States. 
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The dynamics of changes in the number of nuclear weapons can be found in 
Figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 - Dynamics of changes in the world's nuclear arsenals 
in 1945-2015 [44] 
 
Thus, there are several multilateral international treaties banning the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, in which most countries of the world participate. 
There are also a number of agreements between Russia and the USA to limit and 
reduce the number of nuclear weapons and it is the bilateral agreements between the 
USA and Russia that are responsible for quantitative disarmament. However, it 
should be noted that in addition to reducing the number, there is a process of 
modernization of nuclear weapons, which is almost impossible to stop. 
 
 
2.3 Nuclear arsenal of countries 
 
 
 The number of nuclear warheads in the world has declined significantly since 
the Cold War: from a peak of 63,500 in 1987 to 13,410 in early 2020 (Table 2.3. 
Quite often, these achievements are portrayed as the result of existing arms 
control agreements, but most of the reduction took place in the 1990s. In recent years, 
the rate of reduction has slowed significantly, instead of planning nuclear 
disarmament, nuclear powers plan to maintain their arsenals for the indefinite future.  
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Table 2.3 - Nuclear arsenals of the world [45] 
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Nine nuclear powers - the USA, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, 
Israel and North Korea - together owned 13,400 nuclear weapons by the beginning of 
2020, 465 fewer than last year. This decline was largely due to the disposal of 
obsolete nuclear arsenals by Russia and the USA, which together still hold more than 
90% of the world's nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia and the USA are 
implementing large-scale and expensive programs to replace and modernize their 
nuclear warheads, missile and aircraft delivery systems, as well as nuclear weapons 
production facilities. Both countries have assigned new or expanded roles to nuclear 
weapons in their military plans and doctrines, marking a significant reversal of the 
post-Cold War trend toward the gradual marginalization of nuclear weapons [46]. 
The numbers of nuclear warheads (table 2.3) clearly show that the global 
balance of nuclear capabilities plays in favor of Russia and the USA, which were 
constantly developing their strategic capabilities during the Cold War. They are the 
largest holders of nuclear warheads, and they are the main "contributors" to nuclear 
disarmament. As the two states are well ahead of all other nuclear powers in the 
stockpile of nuclear warheads, the latter lack sufficient motivation to reduce their 
own arsenals. For example, China has increased the number of nuclear warheads by 
more than a quarter in the last five years. India and Pakistan are gradually increasing 
the number and diversity of their nuclear forces, and North Korea is prioritizing its 
military nuclear program as a central element of its national security strategy.  
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3 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
3.1 Ukraine as a powerful nuclear state 
 
 
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, one of the most painful issues was the 
division of military property of the former USSR army. The problem of belonging to 
a colossal nuclear arsenal was especially acute. The number of USSR’s nuclear 
arsenals at the end of 1990, according to the American Arms Control Association, 
was more than 10,200 nuclear warheads. After the collapse of the USSR, the number 
of nuclear states in the Commonwealth of Independent States formally increased to 
four, as in addition to Russia, strategic forces remained in the territories of the newly 
independent republics - Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (Fig. 3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Distribution of the nuclear arsenal of the USSR between the newly 
formed countries [47] 
 
Ukraine's nuclear potential was the third in the world, after Russia and           
the USA. 
Initially, the Russian Federation stated that it did not intend to control all 
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1991, four states signed an agreement in Almaty on joint measures to control nuclear 
weapons. Nine days later in Minsk, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
member states signed an agreement on the need to establish a Joint Command of the 
strategic forces of the former USSR [48]. 
However, between the signing of the two treaties on December 25, 1991, 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin received a device from Mikhail Gorbachev that 
stored codes to activate the nuclear arsenal, and the Russian leader became the sole 
owner of the symbolic key to the USSR’s strategic arsenal. The Minsk agreements 
stated that from now on the decision on the use of nuclear weapons should be made 
by the President of Russia, but subject to mandatory coordination with the leaders of 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as consultation with other CIS            
members [49]. 
At the same time, both among the members of CIS and in Western countries, 
there was growing confidence that none of the post-USSR republics would be able to 
ensure the proper storage and safety of nuclear warheads except Russia. The issue of 
the lack of a unified strategic weapons control in the former USSR has caused serious 
concern in the USA and Europe.  
After Ukraine's declaration of independence, the tendency to change the 
principles of foreign policy and attitude to nuclear weapons began to gain 
momentum. It began with the fact that Kyiv renounced almost all agreements within 
the CIS, which concerned the common military-strategic space. The CIS Strategic 
Forces did not include any of the units stationed on Ukrainian territory that held 
strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, in April 1992, Ukraine incorporated the 
Strategic Forces stationed on its territory into the Ukrainian army [50]. 
Maintenance of nuclear warheads is a complex of complex operations. Some 
operations can be carried out only at the factory-manufacturer of ammunition, 
especially in the case of ammunition that is in an emergency condition. The technical 
support of the warheads was managed from a single center - one of the main 
departments of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and then Russia. But the further 
the process of re-subordination of the Strategic Forces located on its territory to 
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Ukraine and bringing their personnel to the Ukrainian oath, the more confusion arose 
with the maintenance of nuclear weapons. Step by step, the criteria for physical 
access to ammunition were blurred. Former Minister of Justice of Ukraine S. 
Holovatyy then explicitly stated that Kyiv needed nuclear weapons to "deter Russia". 
In turn, the then President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk asked to provide guarantees that 
Ukrainian nuclear weapons will be destroyed and not transferred to the Russian army 
[51]. Nevertheless, with the mediation of the USA, the Ukrainian leadership managed 
to convince of the need to transfer strategic nuclear arsenals to Moscow. 
 
 
3.2 Nuclear disarmament of Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum 
 
 
 After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus considered it 
necessary to keep the existing nuclear forces under a single command. Already 
during the first meetings of the leaders of the three countries in Minsk on December 
7-8, and then in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991, the fate of the strategic nuclear 
weapons of the former USSR was discussed [52]. 
 The principles of non-nuclear ("not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear 
weapons") were enshrined in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, 
adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on                                
July 6, 1990 [53]. 
 The Ukrainian parliament, ratifying the CIS treaty, insisted on 13 reservations, 
2 of which directly addressed the issue of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 8 stated that 
Ukraine intended to achieve non-nuclear status "by eliminating the entire nuclear 
arsenal under international control." Paragraph 9 declared that the presence of 
strategic forces on the territory of Ukraine was temporary and their legislative status 
and length of stay would be determined in accordance with Ukrainian law and by 
means of a "special international agreement concluded between the states where 
nuclear missiles of the former USSR are deployed" [54]. 
 The main reasons that prompted Ukraine to abandon nuclear weapons are: 
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 1. Lack of complete control over nuclear weapons. Ukraine's nuclear stockpile 
was powerful, but neither the first president of Ukraine, L. Kravchuk, nor the second, 
L. Kuchma, had access to an automated strategic nuclear arsenal management 
system. Kyiv has never had control over its nuclear weapons; all the keys were in 
Moscow. The maximum that Kyiv could count on was to be able to block launches 
without its consent. Thus, nuclear disarmament has become for Ukraine rather one of 
the steps to get out of the Kremlin's control [55]. 
 2. Technical condition of nuclear weapons. There were many questions about 
the technical condition of nuclear missiles. The information was contradictory: from 
"everything is fine" to warnings that the "Second Chernobyl" is brewing in Ukrainian 
nuclear mines. 
 3. The cost of maintenance. In the early 1990s, the country was in an economic 
crisis, so Ukraine did not have the financial resources to maintain its nuclear 
potential, as it already had a significant state budget deficit [56]. 
 4. Types of nuclear weapons. Strategic intercontinental missiles were Ukraine's 
nuclear weapon. Missiles aimed at the USA, which were powerless against Russia. 
Instead, Ukraine itself was targeted by American nuclear missiles. Theoretically, 
tactical nuclear weapons could deter Russia in the event of a conflict. At one time, 
Ukraine did have three to four thousand such warheads, but Russia quickly and semi-
secretly took tactical nuclear weapons to itself in the first months after the country's 
declaration of independence. The strategic weapons that remained in Ukraine on the 
geopolitical chessboard only strengthened Moscow's position and played against the 
USA [57]. 
 5. An idealistic view of the future of a world without nuclear weapons, 
advocated by young members of the new democratic movement and former Soviet 
dissidents.  
 6. Diplomatic isolation. Despite all these reasons, Kyiv was in no hurry to part 
with its nuclear weapons. This has put the country in de facto isolation in the 
international arena. US President Clinton's first visit to independent Ukraine was a 
demonstration of the pressure and threat of complete isolation. His plane landed in 
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Kyiv in January 1994, but Clinton did not even leave the airport. Ukrainian President 
L. Kravchuk had to go to the airport for talks [58]. 
 In such circumstances, there was neither opportunity nor real sense in Kyiv to 
continue to insist on the preservation of nuclear weapons. The choice was simple: 
either join the club of new states and build democracy with the support of the West, 
or shut yourself off from nuclear missiles that you can't even control, and become a 
country isolated from the world.  
 On November 16, 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968. These actions confirmed that 
Ukraine is the owner of all nuclear weapons inherited from the USSR and intends to 
get rid of them completely, using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful               
purposes [59]. 
 In view of the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and Ukraine's commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons on its territory, 
the Budapest Memorandum was concluded on December 5, 1994 between Ukraine, 
the USA, Russia and the United Kingdom, providing appropriate security guarantees 
(Table 3.2) [60]. 
  
Table 3.2 - Countries involved in the process of concluding the Budapest  
Memorandum [61]  
Country Leader Participation 
Ukraine L.Kuchma Country-signatory of memorandum 
Russia B.Yeltsin Country-signatory of memorandum 
Great Britain D.Major Country-signatory of memorandum 
USA B.Clinton Country-signatory of memorandum 
China T.Tsemin’n 
Did not participate in the signing of the 
memorandum, but joined its provisions, 
providing Ukraine with security guarantee 
France F.Mitteran 
Did not participate in the signing of the 
memorandum, but joined its provisions, 
providing Ukraine with security guarantee 
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Under Memorandum, the USA, the Russian Federation, and the United 
Kingdom undertook: 
  - respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine;  
- refrain from the threat of force, its use against the territorial integrity / 
political independence of Ukraine; never use weapons against Ukraine other than for 
self-defense purposes or in any other way in accordance with the UN Charter; 
 - to refrain from economic pressure aimed at subordinating to its own interests 
the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty, to obtain any 
benefits;  
- seek immediate action by the UN Security Council to assist Ukraine if it is 
threatened with aggression using nuclear weapons;  
- not to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, except in the case of an attack on 
themselves, their and their territories, the armed forces, their allies;  
- consult in the event of a situation giving rise to a question of these               
obligations [62]. 
A number of scholars and politicians believe that the Budapest Memorandum 
has no security guarantee mechanism due to the difference between the English and 
Ukrainian texts of the Memorandum: in the Ukrainian version the title sounds like 
"Memorandum on Security guarantees", in English - "Memorandum on Security 
Assurances" [63]. 
On the other hand, the document contains the phrase "Signed in four equally 
authentic copies in Ukrainian, English and Russian." The signatures of the President 
of the USA and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom are not only under the 
English text, but also under the Ukrainian and Russian texts, which state "гарантії" 
and "гарантии".  
Thus, in addition to the signatory countries to this agreement (USA, Ukraine, 
Great Britain, Russia), its parties are also China and France, which have acceded to 
the provisions of the memorandum. However, despite the fact that the Budapest 
Memorandum provided security guarantees to the most powerful countries in the 
international political arena, they were later violated. 
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3.3 Results of nuclear disarmament for Ukraine and prospects for returning the status 
of a nuclear state 
 
 
Following the course of renouncing its nuclear status, Ukraine has fulfilled its 
obligations, despite all obstacles. In May 1996, the export of nuclear warheads from 
Ukraine was completed [64]. 
Ukraine's declaration of non-nuclear status has not only had positive 
consequences, but has also created new foreign policy challenges for our country, 
forcing scientists, researchers, politicians and the public to constantly return to 
studying and analyzing this topic [65]. 
Ukraine became the center of attention of the world community in 2014 after 
the annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in eastern Ukraine - in Luhansk 
and Donetsk regions. In connection with these events, discussions in Ukrainian 
society intensified on the issue of nuclear disarmament in Ukraine and the 
implementation of the terms of the Budapest Memorandum.  
On November 27, 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, pursuant 
to paragraph 6 of the Memorandum, appealed to the signatories of the Budapest 
Memorandum to hold urgent consultations to ensure full compliance and immediate 
cessation of Russian aggression against Ukraine [66]. 
However, did this appeal have no positive consequences, which once again 
underlined the ineffectiveness of the Budapest Memorandum and called into question 
the appropriateness of Ukraine's renunciation of its nuclear arsenal? 
The past presence of nuclear potential, appropriate infrastructure and 
professionals in this field of production provide Ukraine with the necessary basis for 
the restoration of nuclear weapons. The success of the development of a "peaceful" 
atom also has a positive aspect. Thus, according to the World Nuclear Association, as 
of 2019, the share of nuclear energy in the structure of total production in Ukraine is 
53.9%. According to this indicator, Ukraine shares 2-3 places in Europe with 
Slovakia and is second only to France (70.6%). In addition, Ukraine ranks first in 
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Europe and 10th in the world in terms of proven uranium reserves. Together, I am 
creating the preconditions for a possible restoration of the state's nuclear status [67]. 
The issue of ways to restore Ukraine's nuclear status is often discussed by 
political authorities. A number of politicians believe that the disarmament of Ukraine 
under the Budapest Memorandum was meaningless, as weapons continue to be the 
main argument in international relations, focusing on restoring the status of a nuclear 
state as a deterrent to aggressive actions by the Russian Federation.  
Let’s consider in more detail the prospects for the return of Ukraine's nuclear 
status in the framework of the SWOT analysis (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 - SWOT-analysis of prospects for the return of Ukraine's nuclear 
status 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Large reserves of uranium; 
 Experience in owning of nuclear 
weapon ; 
 availability of scientific potential in 
this field; 
  availability of design bureaus and 
productions that are possible to renew; 
 presence of operating nuclear reactors 
 International non-proliferation 
obligations; 
 obsolescence of the material base;  
  lack of financial resources; 
 hostilities on the territory of the 
country; 
Perspectives Threats 
 strengthening the country's military 
power; 
 increasing influence in international 
politics; 
 creation of new jobs 
 economic and political sanctions; 
  risk of international isolation; 
  state budget deficit; 
 fact of the presence of nuclear 
weapons on the territory (its storage is 
already a certain risk); 
 duration of the process of rebuilding 
the nuclear arsenal 
  
 The main prospect of creating its own nuclear arsenal is to strengthen military 
power in order to guarantee territorial integrity and national security. After all, there 
has never been a case in the world where a country with nuclear weapons has been 
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subjected to a military attack. And given the annexation of Crimea and the start of 
hostilities in the Donbas by Russia, this issue is becoming vital. 
 And although the creation of new jobs at the expense of this area will not be of 
great importance in the country, the beginning of a nuclear program can be an 
impetus for the development of Ukrainian science. In the longer term, we can gain 
increased influence in the international political arena and the opportunity to join 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
 In order to fully assess the scale of the threats posed by the prospect of 
developing nuclear weapons, it is important to assess global trends in the use of 
nuclear energy. 
 And in the world there is a tendency to abandon the use of nuclear energy. Italy 
became the first country to shut down its own nuclear power plants, Austria was the 
first country to build nuclear power plants but did not put them into operation, 
moreover, it abandoned the use of electricity produced by nuclear power plants in 
other countries [68]. Other countries are joining this process. France, Taiwan, 
Switzerland and Belgium have already developed plans to cut off electricity from 
nuclear power plants, which will be implemented in the near future. Also, a number 
of countries have launched processes to reduce nuclear energy production. Atomic 
energy leaders such as the USA, Britain, France, Japan, and a number of other 
countries have launched processes to reduce nuclear power production, significantly 
reducing the number of plants [69]. 
 There are two main reasons for this trend: 
 - accidents at the Three Mile Island NPP, the Chornobyl NPP and the 
Fokusima-1 NPP, which showed threats to the use of these energy sources. 
 - development of renewable energy.  
 This process is important given the uranium enrichment procedure. NTP 
predicts that uranium can be enriched only for peaceful purposes - up to 4-5%. 
Armed uranium must be enriched at least up to 90 percent. Therefore, countries 




Unlike Ukraine, its partners are not fulfilling their part of the agreement on Ukraine's 
nuclear-free status. Although Ukraine has every legal basis to withdraw from the 
agreements, the main risk is international economic and political sanctions, under the 
influence of which Ukraine may find itself in complete isolation, the negative 
consequences of which are difficult to exaggerate. 
 Also significant is the problem of maintaining and servicing nuclear weapons, 
which require significant financial costs. Each year, the International Campaign to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons publishes a report with approximate costs. In 2019, total 
costs amounted to 72.9 billion dollars. The largest in the USA - 35.4 billion, in 
France - 4 billion, in India - 2.3 billion, in Israel and Pakistan - about one billion 
dollars. This is just the cost of maintenance, we add to this the cost of creation (an 
accurate estimate of which is impossible, but in the experience of other countries 
costs many times more than the cost of maintenance) and we get a significant burden 
on the country's  budget [70]. 
Based on the SWOT analysis, it can be concluded that the successful 
development of nuclear energy in combination with significant natural uranium 
reserves and scientific potential in this area can be a good basis for the development 
of Ukrainian nuclear weapons. However, weak economy, international treaties on 
nuclear non-proliferation and the general trend of denuclearization of the world add 















1. Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons, the proliferation and use 
of which are controlled by special rules of international law. A country with nuclear 
weapons not only gains a military advantage over other countries, but also has greater 
influence in the international political arena.  
2. Nuclear weapons were first invented and tested by the USA in 1945. The 
exceptional destructive power of nuclear weapons, demonstrated by the bombing, 
marked the beginning of a nuclear arms race in which the USA and the USSR 
became the main protagonists.  
3. Currently, 9 countries have nuclear weapons; among them are the USA, 
Russia, China, Britain, France, Pakistan, India, North Korea and Israel. The USA and 
the USSR make up more than 90% of the world’s nuclear arsenal.  
4. The assessment of the threat to humanity, the fear that the exchange of 
nuclear strikes between the United States and the USSR will lead to the end of life on 
the planet and the enormous burden on the economies of the countries led to a 
reduction in nuclear arsenals, carriers and means of delivery.  
5. There are several multilateral international treaties banning the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, in which most countries participate. There are also a number of 
bilateral agreements between Russia and the USA to reduce the number of nuclear 
weapons which have made the biggest contribution to quantitative disarmament. 
However, in addition to reducing the number, there is a process of modernization of 
nuclear weapons, which is almost impossible to stop. 
6. After gaining independence, Ukraine inherited from the USSR the third 
largest nuclear potential in the world, second only to the USA and Russia. However, 
in the process of lengthy negotiations and the conclusion of a number of international 
agreements, the Ukrainian leadership decided to abandon nuclear weapons in 
exchange for security guarantees.  
7. The main reasons that prompted Ukraine to abandon nuclear weapons were: 
lack of full control over the nuclear arsenal, the risk of international isolation, 
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unsatisfactory technical condition of weapons and the high cost of its maintenance. 
These factors led to Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum.  
8. The signing of the Budapest Memorandum became the quintessence of the 
process of depriving Ukraine of its nuclear status. In exchange for the renunciation of 
nuclear weapons, Ukraine has received certain security guarantees from 5 countries 
that possess nuclear weapons. However, the events of 2014 showed that these 
guarantees were violated, and none of the signatories of the Memorandum was held 
responsible. The situation with nuclear weapons in Ukraine has confirmed the need to 
develop new approaches to the problem of ensuring the security of the state in 
changing geostrategic conditions. 
9. The foreign policy challenges facing our state force us to return again and 
again to the analysis of the prospects for restoring Ukraine's nuclear status and 
creating a new nuclear arsenal. However, based on the SWOT analysis, it can be 
argued that today the revival of the nuclear program will create more new threats to 
national interests than development prospects. Weak economy, international treaties 
on nuclear non-proliferation and the general trend of denuclearization of the world 
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The master’s thesis focuses on the study of the causes and consequences of 
Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and prospects of returning Ukraine's nuclear status. 
The history of development and proliferation of nuclear weapons is studied. The role 
and influence of countries with nuclear weapons in the international political arena 
are assessed. The causes and consequences of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament have 
been analyzed. Prospects and threats to return of Ukraine's nuclear status are 
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Капатус Н. В. Глобальне ядерне роззброєння: наслідки та виклики для 
України. - Кваліфікаційна магістерська робота. Сумський державний 
університет, Суми, 2020. 
Кваліфікаційна магістерська робота присвячена дослідженню причин та 
наслідків ядерного роззброєння України та оцінці перспектив повернення 
ядерного статусу. Досліджено історію розробки та поширення ядерної зброї. 
Оцінено роль та вплив країн, що мають ядерну зброю, на міжнародній 
політичній арені. Проаналізовано причини та наслідки ядерного роззброєння 
України. Оцінено перспективи та загрози повернення ядерного статусу 
України. 
 Ключові слова: ядерна зброя, поширення, роззброєння, ядерні держави, 
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